some of its land to the city of New Brunswick, New Jersey, in return for the renovation of the city's main post office. The Veteran Affairs Administration leased an underused medical center to a private developer, who in turn built an office building for Veterans Affairs. Also, the Department of Energy sold unneeded land at its Oak Ridge National Laboratory to a private developer, who in turn built a building and leased it to the department's prime contractor for Department of Energy mission support.
Proponents of public-private partnerships argue that they afford a federal agency a realistic alternative for obtaining capital that is less costly than the normal budgeting process. From a federal agency's perspective, such partnerships can be very attractive because the agency can obtain capital without first having to secure sufficient budget appropriations to cover the full cost of the capital.
Critics of these ventures, however, caution that they are not the least expensive means of meeting capital needs, although they may appear to be in the short term (U.S. Government Accounting Office, 2003) .
PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE ARTICLE
This article addresses the concern raised by the critics of public-private partnerships. Because it is only recently that federal agencies have begun pursuing such partnerships to obtain capital assets, data are insufficient to answer the critic's concerns empirically. Consequently, I pursued a conceptual approach to answer the question of whether publicprivate partnerships are likely to be economically justified from the government's perspective.
I limited the scope of the article to federal capital involving land improvement projects and buildings. I excluded capital involving high-technology assets, such as information technology, and assets owned by state and local governments, such as highways.
The article is significant because it addresses an important public policy issue: whether a federal agency's acquisition of capital is justifiable without direct authorization from Congress.
Method
In this article, I examined a hypothetical situation in which a federal agency is operating a laboratory in an old facility, which is in a high state of disrepair. This agency has just justified to its headquarters the need for a new, 12,500-square-meter multipurpose building to replace the old facility. This federal agency also owns underused land that can be developed, and it wishes to consider meeting its need for the new facility through a public-private partnership. In particular, it faces the following choice: It either seeks budget authority to build the multipurpose building on its property, or it leases some of its underused land to a private-sector entity and enters into a public-private partnership with that private entity to build and operate that facility on that land for the federal agency to use for some specific time period.
Under the federal budget scenario, the agency submits a budget request to Congress asking for budget authority to design and construct the facility. Congress then decides whether to approve the request for the following year. If it decides favorably on the request, it appropriates the requested budget authority to the agency. The agency typically then hires a design firm to design the building. Once the design is complete, the agency hires a firm to construct it. After the building is constructed, the agency takes control of the facility and operates until it decides to dispose of it.
Under a public-private partnership, the federal agency leases two hectares of land to a private sector partner-such as a local, nonprofit economic development authority-for 35 years. The private partner secures debt financing and then hires a contractor to design and build the facility. Once the building is commissioned, the private partner leases the space in the building to the federal agency. The term of this occupancy lease is equal to the term of the bond repayment. The federal agency pays its rent to the private partner, who in turn repays the debt creditors through a bond trustee. At the end of the ground lease, the agency has the option to buy the building. If the agency chooses not to buy it, the private partner must demolish the building and return the land to its unimproved state. This partnership arrangement is depicted in Figure 1 .
I then estimated likely cost consequences of relevant cash flows to the agency during a common 25-year time period. To derive some estimates for agency costs, I also had to estimate likely cost and revenue consequences for the private partner. Given the limited available data, I developed order of magnitude cost estimates-an estimating technique usually used for feasibility studies. Last, I applied probabilistic risk analysis to draw inferences about the federal agency's decision situation.
ASSUMPTIONS
For the partnership scenario, I assumed the following: The federal agency will lease the land to the local economic development authority for 35 years at a fair price and will ask this private partner to quickly build a 12,500-square-meter multipurpose building comprising 60% laboratory space and 40% office space. The economic development authority, a private, nonprofit firm with no equity stake in the partnership, will issue bonds for 25 years. It will take 2 years to obtain financing and then design and build the facility. The private partner will use a design-build approach to deliver the building because, in general, this method delivers a facility quicker than through the more traditional design-bid-build approach; 1 however, it is not necessarily a less expensive delivery approach (U.S. Department of Transportation, 2006) . I chose to examine the two different delivery approaches for two reasons. First, they are the two primary methods of project delivery used in public building construction. Second, the examination of these two approaches allowed me to consider some variation in the conditions between public and private financing approaches-other than the financing source.
Once the private partner completes construction and commissions the multipurpose building, it will lease occupancy of the entire building to the federal agency for 23 years at a rate equal to the partner's debt service requirement on the bond. In addition to paying the occupancy rent, the federal agency will pay for local taxes, insurance for the building, and operations, maintenance, and major repairs of the building throughout its lease term. The federal agency will use its annual operating budget to pay its occupancy expenses.
If the federal agency finances the design and construction of the building through the routine budget process, the source of its funds will be a capital investment appropriation earmarked specifically for the project. The project will take at least 4 years to commission the building: 1 year to plan and budget for the building, 1 year to design it, and 2 years to build it. There are two primary reasons why the federal agency will take longer to deliver the building this way than through a private partner. The first is that the agency must seek budget authority through the relatively protracted federal budgeting process. The second is that the agency, typically because of tradition, will follow the more common (and more timeconsuming) design-bid-build delivery approach.
The building will be designed and constructed to local standards and codes, regardless of whether it is financed privately or publicly. Moreover, the prevailing labor rates for construction workers will be the same for the private-sector partner and the government agency. Thus, I assumed that the direct field costs of construction would be the same for both scenarios. I justify this assumption with the following logic: The subcontractors vying for this direct field work are bidding, essentially, in the same competitive marketplace in either scenario. Their work requirements are the same in each scenario, because construction standards and codes are assumed to be the same. Also, their labor costs will be the same in both scenarios, because the prevailing labor rates are assumed to be the same. Consequently, from a subcontractor's perspective, the demand conditions in each scenario for its services are identical. Thus, the prices it would charge would likely be the same. I also assume that the annual operating, maintenance, and repair costs will be the same in both scenarios. I justify that assumption with the observation that in either scenario, the federal agency is responsible for providing and paying for those services. Consequently, it would follow the same operating and maintenance approach and schedule regardless of who finances the construction of the building.
I assumed that the cost of operating and maintaining the old, currently occupied building would continue to be borne by the federal agency until the new facility is commissioned and operations can be transferred to it. I also assumed that the costs of demolishing the old building would essentially be the same in either scenario. Thus, I did not account for those costs in the analysis.
For the economic analysis of the forecasted cash flows, I assumed that the annual price escalation rates would range from 3% to 10% for construction costs, with a most likely value of 5% (based on Stark & Gaughan, 2005) , and 2.5% to 3.8% for operating costs, with a most likely value of 3.5% (InflationData.com, 2005) . I assumed a discount rate of 4.8%-the rate of a 30-year U.S. Treasury bond (U.S. Department of Treasury, 2005).
DIRECT FIELD CONSTRUCTION COSTS
In developing likely direct field costs of construction for each scenario, I reviewed cost data for both public and private construction projects from multiple sources for building type and space requirements comparable to my hypothetical requirement (Bissell & Gallay, 2006; Design Cost Data Magazine, 2005; Gallay & Bissell, 2005a , 2005b Westerbeck, 2001) . On the basis of those data, I estimated the order of magnitude point estimate of direct field construction costs at $30.1 million. Table 1 gives details of that cost by category.
Given that this estimate was an order of magnitude quality, I then assumed an accuracy range of plus 30% and minus 10% about that $30.1 million point estimate. This accuracy range is consistent with generally accepted cost-estimating standards (Amos, 2004) . I then derived a probability distribution of that cost estimate that yielded a mean cost of $32.7 million with a standard deviation of $4.5 million.
I used the direct field cost of construction as the basis for developing cost estimates for not only the total project costs of both scenarios but also the financing requirement for the publicprivate partnership scenario.
INDIRECT CONSTRUCTION COSTS
For purposes of this article, indirect construction costs consist of four categories common to both scenarios and one category specific to government financing. The four common cost categories are general conditions, overhead, and profit; design fees; contingency; and project management. I assumed general conditions, overhead, and profit ranged from 10% to 15% for the government-finance construction and 9% to 13% for the privately financed construction. The difference in ranges is due primarily to the typical bureaucratic red tape involved in government contracting (Gallay & Corfman, 2000) . I assumed the design fees ranged from 9% to 11% for government-financed construction to 6% to 10% for the privately financed construction. The difference in ranges stem from the different project delivery models used: The design-build approach typically has lower design costs (Gallay & Corfman, 2000) . Because I used probabilistic risk analysis to estimate costs, there was no need to specify a contingency value.
2 The project management category comprises the government's costs for the following functions: design management, engineering management, construction management, and project management. These costs can add 10% to 15% on top of the direct field construction costs (Gallay & Bissell, 2005a , 2005b Meek & Gallay, 2005) . For the private sector, project management typically involves construction management. I assumed this cost ranged from 7% to 12%. The fifth cost categories consist of the government's overhead markup. This markup covers the general costs that government agencies incur in managing construction projects. These costs typically range from 20% to 25% of the direct field construction costs (Meek & Gallay, 2005) . Table 2 gives the range of parametric relationships I used in estimating these costs.
COMMON OPERATING COSTS
The operating costs consist of three cost categories: operating and maintenance costs of the legacy facility that will be vacated once the new facility is ready for occupancy, the operating and maintenance costs of the new facility, and capital repairs. The first two categories comprise annual costs. Table 3 presents my estimates for those costs, derived from previous studies and published data (Bissell & Gallay, 2006; Building Owners and Managers Association International, 2005; Gallay & Corfman, 2000; Gallay, 2005a Gallay, , 2005b .
I grouped the capital repair costs in three time periods: at the end of 10 years of operation, at the end of 15 years of operation, and at the end of 20 years of operations. My estimates appear in Table 4 . Gallay / FINANCING FEDERAL CAPITAL 143 
GROUND LEASE COSTS
For the private financing scenario, the federal agency leases a two-hectare parcel of land to the private partner for a term of 35 years. I assumed a fair lease cost of $5,000 to $10,000 per year.
BOND COSTS
The bond deal is a relatively risky proposition because the federal agency will strive to obtain highly favorable lease terms that will introduce uncertainty about the value of the venture as a private investment. The federal agency, for reasons explained later, will likely seek an agreement that would be deemed an operating lease by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget. For example, the term of such a lease would likely be short (perhaps 5 years) with multiple options to renew. Consequently, annual revenue streams from the lease, which are needed to repay the bond, are not contractually guaranteed throughout the entire life of the bond. Moreover, the agency will likely insist on a favorable cancellation clause (such as within 1 year of giving notice). This condition would increase the uncertainty over continued revenue streams, all the more so because the building will be built on a secure U.S. government installation. The security requirements for access and operation on this government installation are not particularly attractive in commercial terms, so the owner will likely have difficulty finding commercial tenants who could replace the government tenants. This risk will intensify if the expected rent is in the higher range of rental rates in the local commercial real estate market. The federal agency must seek an operating lease instead of a capital lease-type arrangement. Otherwise, to comply with federal budgeting rules, the agency would have to set aside, at the outset of the project, budget authority equal to the net present value of all future rent payments under the term of the lease (U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 2005) . That amount of budget authority would be so huge as to defeat the purpose of pursuing the partnership arrangement-after all, if the agency had that amount of budget authority under its control, it could finance the construction itself, without private financing.
On the basis of recent research (Bissell & Gallay, 2006; Gallay & Bissell, 2005a , 2005b , I made the following assumptions about bond costs. In a best-case scenario, the private partner issues a bond at 5.00% after obtaining bond insurance. In a most-likely scenario, the private partner issues a bond at 5.75% but without bond insurance. In a worst-case scenario, the private partner issues a bond at 6.50% and without bond insurance. This is a relatively small bond issuance; consequently, the cost to the private owner for obtaining the bond would range between 1% and 5%, with a most-likely cost of 2% of the total loan requirement. This is a reasonable cost range for a bond issuance (Higgins, 2004) . It accounts for the following expenses: capitalized interest fund deposit, underwriter's discount, debt service reserve fund surety bond premium, and legal fees.
PROPERTY TAXES AND INSURANCE COSTS
I assumed that the local county's property tax rate on the private partner's "improvements" to the government land would range from $1.00 per $100 of assessed value of the building to $1.25 per $100 of assessed value. I took the midpoint of that range as the most likely value. This range reflects the tax rates in Northern Virginia counties ( It is important to note that the federal agency would not pay local government property taxes if the building is financed and, hence, owned by the federal government. Correspondingly, the federal agency would not pay building insurance premiums if it owned the building, because the federal government self-insures its facilities.
It is likely that some local jurisdictions might decide to offer the private owner a property tax exemption to foster economic development in their communities. Moreover, the duration of such exemptions might vary from relatively short, say 5 to 10 years, to relatively long, such as more than 25 years. Because such decisions are typically made on a case-by-case basis, I had no useful basis for predicting their probabilities of occurrence. Consequently, I chose to model both situations, with property taxes and without, to determine how critical this variable might be in justifying the partnership approach. $60.3 million (within a 10% to 90% confidence interval), with a mean value of $51.2 million. Figure 2 depicts the estimated probability distribution and associated statistics for the total project construction costs.
My estimate for the present value cost of acquiring this facility via the governmentfinanced approach during the common 25-year period ranges from $70.0 million to $91.2 million (within a 10% to 90% confidence interval). The mean present value estimate is $80.4 million. Figure 3 depicts the estimated probability distribution and associated statistics for that present value cost range.
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP
Under the public-private approach, the federal agency met its need for a new facility within 2 years. My estimate for the total project cost of construction to the private partner ranges from $34.8 million to $49.9 million (within a 10% to 90% confidence interval), with a mean cost of $42.3 million. This cost is not borne by the federal agency directly. Yet the cost is important to the agency, because it must repay the private partner for financing this cost through annual rent payments for the next 23 years. Figure 4 depicts the estimated probability distribution and associated statistics for the total project construction costs.
To pay for this construction through debt financing alone, the private partner will need to raise $49.5 million. I arrived at the value by adding the private partner's mean cost of construction (including design costs, general conditions and overhead costs, and profit), $42.3 million, with a contingency value of $5.8 million (the value of one standard deviation about the $42.3 million mean statistic) and the cost for financing the bond $1.4 million. To repay that debt, the partner will charge an annual rent of $314.84 per square meter ($29.25 per square foot), well within the range of rental rates for this type of commercial space in most large suburban areas (Building Owners and Managers Association International, 2005) .
WITH PROPERTY TAX
Under the local property tax scenario, I estimated that annual tax bills, which ultimately are shouldered by the federal agency through the rent it pays, will range from more than $476,000 My premise for those tax bills is that the initial assessed value of the property equals its market value of $48 million (the cost of new construction, including contingency). Thereafter, the assessed value will be equal to the present value of the future rental revenue streams. My estimate for the present value cost of the privately financed approach during the common 25-year period, including the estimated property taxes, ranges from $80.9 million to $87.5 million (within a 10% to 90% confidence interval). The estimated mean present value cost is $84.2 million. Figure 5 depicts the estimated probability distribution and associated statistics for that net present value cost range. The estimated mean present value cost is $84.2 million, which is a little higher than the estimated mean cost estimate of $80.4 million for the government-financed approach. However, this relatively small difference between the mean costs is statistically significant ( p = 0.0000). Thus, the public-private partnership is not less costly under the "with property tax" scenario. I chose not to consider the costs to the federal agency of continuing to lease the facility from the private partner beyond the 25-year analysis period because I viewed that as a new decision situation that would require a separate analysis.
WITHOUT PROPERTY TAX
Under the scenario without property tax, I examined two excursions. In one excursion, the local government granted a property tax exemption for 10 years. In the other, the local government granted an exemption for the entire 25-year period. The 10-year exemption had only a marginal benefit, lowering the overall net present value cost range to the federal agency of the private partnership approach to between $76.6 million and $82.6 million (within a 10% to 90% confidence interval). The estimated mean present value is $79.6 million, which is slightly lower than the estimated mean cost estimate of $80.4 million for the government-financed approach. The difference between the mean costs is statistically significant ( p = 0.0013). Thus, the privatelyfinanced approach is favorable (slightly less costly) under the "10-year exemption of property taxes" scenario. This is a different inference than the one drawn under the no tax scenario. Figure 6 depicts the estimated probability distribution of the costs with a 10-year tax exemption.
The full exemption from taxes appears more favorable to the federal agency. My estimate for the net present value cost to the federal agency of the privately financed approach without property taxes during the common 25-year period ranges from $73.2 million to $78.8 million (within a 10% to 90% confidence interval). The estimated mean net present value is $76.0 million-significantly lower than the mean cost of government-financed alternative ( p = 0.0000). Yet the trend to the federal agency is favorable. Figure 7 depicts the estimated probability distribution and associated statistics for that present value cost range. 
Conclusion
The findings suggest that the present value of the costs to the federal agency for pursuing the public-private partnership during the 25-year period is roughly the same as if it acquired the building itself with budget authority-especially if the private partner must pay property taxes once he completes the construction of the facility. Consequently, critics of publicprivate partnerships have a point in asserting that the partnership approach is not necessarily less expensive, especially if the federal agency intends to use the facility for 20 years or more. Yet with a public-private partnership, the agency would be able to meet its facility needs at least 2 years earlier at no additional (equivalent) cost. That cost-free shorter delivery would likely yield a net social benefit to the American people equal to at least 2 years' worth of the agency's marginal increase in public service produced in that new facility. The marginal increase in public service would likely result because of two interrelated factors: the new, state-of-the-art multipurpose building would have a more efficient building infrastructure and the employees' morale and motivation would likely improve once they move from their dilapidated facility to the new one. Even if the federal agency used a design-build project delivery approach, the public-private partnership would still be quicker, just because of the inherent time lag in the federal budgeting process.
For this analysis, I assumed that the federally financed project would sail through the budget cycle without a hitch. That best-case scenario rarely occurs, except for the highest priority construction projects. Demand for federal capital investment funding always exceeds the congressionally approved capital budgets. Lower priority projects may take years to make the budget cut, if they make it at all. That would not be the case for a public-private partnership. The private-partnership firm could start construction on a facility to meet the federal agency's need as soon as it could arrange for financing. Moreover, by starting construction essentially right away, the public-private partnership avoids the insidious, compounding effects of construction-related price escalation (which I estimate to range from 3% to 10% per year, with a most likely rate of 5% per year). For the government-financed construction project hypothesized in this study that would cost roughly $58 million today (the mean cost of $51 million plus the standard deviation value of $7 million as the contingency), the inflationary effects on construction prices would be considerable. For example, just a mere 2-year delay in appropriating funds for the project would add, on average, about $8.8 million to the actual cost of construction (which equates about $6.6 million in present value terms). A 3-year delay would add, on average, about $13.5 million to actual cost of construction ($9.7 million in present value terms). Those are not trivial sums! Thus, public-private partnerships could be particularly advantageous to a federal agency with a valid need for a construction project but whose project would compete poorly for capital budgeting with other agency projects. The longer a project will likely take to obtain budget approval, the greater the potential net social benefit (through speedier project delivery) of the public-private partnership. Although the value of this net social benefit would not be reflected directly in the federal agency's financial statement, it would materialize in the increased satisfaction the public would gain from this partnership approach. That's good public policy.
Consequently, I conclude that public-private partnerships can be a useful technique for federal agencies to acquire federal capital.
Notes
1. Under a design-build approach, an owner (private entity or public agency) hires one firm to design and build a facility. Under a design-bid-build approach, an owner first hires a firm to design the facility, then seeks bids to do the construction, and finally hires one of the bidders to construct the facility.
2. A useful rule of thumb for estimating a contingency value is to consider the standard deviation value in the cost-estimate probability distribution as the contingency value.
